



PLANO DE DISCIPLINA

1 DADOS DE IDENTIFICAÇÃO

1.1 Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas

1.2 Departamento de Filosofia

1.3 Disciplina: Tópicos de Epistemologia

1.5 Carga Horária: 60h 1.6 Ano/Semestre: 2024/2

1.7 Professor: Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues

2 EMENTA:

O problema central na epistemologia da percepção e da memória é o de explicar como estas fontes podem nos dar conhecimento ou crença justificada. Este problema tem sido tradicionalmente visto em termos de um argumento cético que pretende mostrar que tal conhecimento e justificação são impossíveis. O ceticismo sobre destaca uma série de dificuldades epistemológicas em relação à natureza e ao papel epistêmico da experiência, e a questão de como a percepção e a memória pode nos colocar em contato com uma realidade independente da mente. As questões que surgem são de importância central para a compreensão do conhecimento e da justificação de forma mais geral, mesmo à parte sua conexão com o ceticismo. Pretende-se, neste curso, analisar e discutir as principais teorias que abordam o caráter epistêmico da percepção e da memória.

3 OBJETIVO:

- Oferecer uma primeira abordagem dos problemas filosóficos relativos à memória e percepção.
- Desenvolver habilidades específicas associadas ao exercício filosófico: identificar problemas, definir conceitos e avaliar argumentos.
- Dominar os conteúdos vistos ao longo disciplina, devendo ser capaz de reconstruí-los adequadamente.

4. Conteúdo Programático:

1. Introdução à Teoria do Conhecimento
2. Análise Tradicional do Conhecimento;
3. Evidencialismo x Confiabilismo / Internismo x Externismo
5. Ceticismo acerca da Percepção e Memória
6. Epistemologia da Percepção
7. Epistemologia da Memória

5. PROCEDIMENTOS METODOLÓGICOS:

Disponibilização de textos; textos didáticos elaborados pelo professor; resumo das aulas, vídeo-aulas, aulas gravadas, indicação de tarefas e atividades, indicação de exercícios, utilização do REDE, uso de TER.

6. PROCEDIMENTOS E CRITÉRIOS DE AVALIAÇÃO:

Ao final da disciplina será exigido um ensaio/artigo, mínimo 6 laudas, sobre algum assunto ou problema relacionado.

7. BIBLIOGRAFIA

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